What does the lifting of Eritrea’s sanctions mean for east Africa?
Border conflicts have marred east African states for decades, but some political goodwill has finally emerged in the region, seeking to build an enduring peace.
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) voted on Wednesday to lift sanctions imposed on Eritrea nearly 10 years ago in 2009, when Resolution 1907 was adopted, accusing Eritrea of supporting armed groups in Somalia. Eritrea was also sanctioned for its part in a border dispute with Djibouti.
The 15 members of the UNSC completed negotiations on Monday and agreed on a resolution drafted by Britain, lifting the arms embargo as well as some targeted sanctions and an asset freeze for individuals in the “Eritrean political and military leadership.”
The UNSC applied the sanctions because of allegations that Eritrea had been supporting “armed groups” and “undermining peace and reconciliation in Somalia.” One of the groups Eritrea was accussed of supporting is Al Shabab. Eritrea denies these allegations.
Andebrhan Welde Giorgis, a former Eritrean ambassador and President of Eri-Platform told me that the sanctions were unjustified, as there was no “incontrovertible evidence” to prove Eritrea had in fact supported Al Shabab.
“Eritrea is domestically repressive and internationally reclusive,” he explained.
“The absence of rule of law, and reluctance to engage the international community to address its concerns led to isolation, and Ethiopia was then able to support sanctions and marginalise Eritrea.”
Former US assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Herman Cohen, also described the decision as a “gross miscarriage of justice”.
Ethiopia and Eritrea have had bitter relations for decades.
The two countries were divided when Italy took control of Eritrea in 1889. Ethiopia re-absorbed Eritrea as an autonomous territory but then annexed it completely in 1962.
This triggered hostilities which eventually turned into a guerrilla movement and then a war for independence. A two-year border dispute followed in 1998, killing close to 100,000 people. The Ethiopia-Eritrea Border Commission was established to mediate the border dispute, which Eritrea accepted and wanted upheld. Ethiopia rejected it, creating long military standoff between the two countries.
“Since the tragic war between Ethiopia and Eritrea from 1998 to 2000, a state of no peace, no war emerged between them,” said Martin Plaut, a senior fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies and author of the book Understanding Eritrea.
When Ethiopia invaded Somalia in 2006 to oust the Union of Islamic Courts, Eritrea allegedly supported armed groups in both Ethiopia and Somalia.
“The Eritreans as a result were accused of supporting Al Shabab in Somalia and Oromo groups against Ethiopia, and quite frankly the Ethiopians did the same in reverse,” Plaut told me.
“This conflict,” he continued, “dragged in the whole of the Horn of Africa destabilising the region, because the Eritreans saw ‘the enemy of my enemy as my friend’.”
Somalia and Ethiopia, supported by Djibouti which also has a border dispute with Eritrea, worked to isolate the country.
The resources of Horn of Africa countries were used to pursue hostile foreign policies, and invested in security instead of more constructive enterprises like development. This eventually exacerbated a lot of issues, instead of addressing their root causes in the Horn.
The Eritreans viewed the sheer size of Ethiopia, as well as the border dispute and Ethiopia’s desire for access to the Red Sea, as an issue which posed an existential threat. But the tone of politics in the region radically changed after Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power in Ethiopia in April this year.
Normalising relations: The Abiy effect
When political leaders meet, even when they’re allied, initial greetings are usually stolid, firm and formal. But when Prime Minister Ahmed disembarked from his plane in Asmara a few months ago, things panned out differently.
A wide smile appeared on the faces of both Eritrean President Afwerki and Prime Minister Ahmed.
In a matter of weeks, Ahmed accepted the ruling by the border commission, diplomatic ties were restored, a Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship was signed, flights resumed between the countries, phone lines reconnected and families separated by the war and its aftermath were brought back together.
Ahmed also visited Mogadishu, following an invitation by Somali President Mohammed Abdullahi Mohammed. The two leaders issued a joint communique, vowing to develop trade, increase the free movement of goods and people and joint investment in four key ports.
By August 22, flights resumed between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu for the first time in more than four decades when the countries fought a war over the Ogaden region in Ethiopia’s east.
This new trend of reconciliatory politics reached its culmination in a series of trilateral meetings between the leaders of Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, focussing on regional economic integration and deeper cooperation.
Giorgis is hopeful about where things are going in the region but says the peace we are seeing is very fragile.
“The relationship between Abiy Ahmed and Isaias Afwerki is a personal one and is not an institutionalised state to state relationship,” he said.
As a result he fears that the unresolved border disputes, as well as the inertia of deep rooted historic conflicts, might unravel regional peace.
Abukar Arman, a former Somali special envoy to the US agrees, highlighting the fact that building trust is a long-term process.
“Despite their swift diplomatic reinstatement and trade deals, Ethiopia and Eritrea are at a symbolic phase of a sustainable reconciliation,” he said.
“Eritrea might trust the Oromo leadership, but it is extremely vigilant about the Tigray and Amhara specters — two ethnic groups that waged wars against it.”
Ahmed’s power largely stems from the fact that he successfully displaced the political power of the Tigrayan elite in Ethiopia whilst winning the support of other major parties in the Ethiopian Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and across the country. The EPRDF is the Ethiopia’s ruling coalition.
When the EPRDF council was considering who its new chairman would be after Hailemariam Desalegn resigned, Ahmed received 108 out of 180 votes, with strong support from the Amhara National Democratic Movement, according to reports. The party entered into an alliance with Ahmed’s Oromo Democratic Party.
However, Ahmed, who recently retained his position as chairman of the EPRDF, has had to deal with increased rates of ethnic violence which have accompanied his political reforms.
“The one thing that could undermine its [Ethiopia’s] exclusive advantage is internal turmoil or civil unrest,” Arman said. “And combustible ethnic grievances and mistrust are not in short supply.”
Systematic state-violence against its population has largely been replaced with concerning levels of inter-ethnic violence. Alongside floods, violence in the Oromia, Amhara, Somali, Gedeo and West Guji region in southern Ethiopia mean that Ethiopia currently has two million internally displaced people, one of the largest displaced populations in the world.
“The major reason behind inter-ethnic violence is the country’s ethnic federal arrangement,” said Yohannes Gedamu, a specialist in Ethiopian politics at Georgia Gwinnett College.
Various ethnic groups are now more aggressively asserting their identities, following years of suppression and are making economic, territorial and political demands often with the hope of redressing historical grievances.
“This system has created a race for resources, territories, and forced displacement or eviction of groups that have lived in different parts of the country for generations,” Gedamu explained.
He said this is because Ethiopia’s political system “prioritises and respects groups rights, that means that an individual’s liberties will be compromised”.
While politics in the region, propelled by Ethiopia’s new charismatic prime minister, has put all countries on a new trajectory, many risks endure. But the decision to support the lifting of sanctions demonstrates a commitment to follow through on their gestures of goodwill.
Djibouti-Eritrea border dispute
The last piece in this jigsaw yet to fit neatly is the Djibouti-Eritrea border dispute over Doumeira Mountain and Doumeira Island, as well as 13 prisoners of war that Djibouti alleges Eritrea has yet to account for.
Both countries have decided to normalise ties following arbitration by the Somali president, who also welcomed the lifting of sanctions.
We welcome the arms and other targeted embargoes on Eriteria been lifted with our collective request. Thanks to the @UN Security Council for this helplful and timely intervention. The Horn of Africa region is swiftly progressing towards partnership and economic cooperation.
— Mohamed Farmaajo (@M_Farmaajo) November 14, 2018
From being close to war in 1996, when Djibouti claimed Eritrea had shelled Ras Doumeira, to mutual visits in 2001, which paved the way for cooperation agreements in 2004, Djibouti-Eritrea relations have ebbed and flowed.
Their relations in recent years have been defined by hostilities at their shared border, which reignited in 2008. Qatar deployed peacekeepers and offered to mediate the dispute but pulled out in June 2017 after which Djibouti’s foreign minister accused Eritrea of taking control of Doumeira Mountain and Doumeira Island again.
When Djibouti offered its views at the UN, as the body considered lifting sanctions, Djibouti’s ambassador to the UN Mohamed Siad Doualeh said: “Continued stalemate is not an option.” “We need to expedite the process,” he continued.
Djibouti was notably absent from both trilateral meetings between the heads of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia. And other analysts have speculated that Eritrea might gain from isolating Djibouti, as Assab port could re-emerge as a serious rival to Djibouti’s ports which manage 90 percent of Ethiopia’s trade.
However the Somali president said the next meeting which will be in Mogadishu should include Djibouti.
Plaut expects the problem to be resolved the same way as many of the other conflicts in the region, as relationships defined by hostilities shift to relationships based on the recognition of the utility of trade and cooperation.
However, “when you look at President Afwerki, he is such a mercurial figure. There is still a possibility he might change his mind.”
Originally published at www.trtworld.com.